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MINIMUM CONTACTS JURISDICTION UNDER
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
United States citizens wishing to contract with foreign states
or foreign corporations face great uncertainty if the contract leads
to a dispute. When a choice of law provision is absent from the
contract, and the dispute cannot be resolved by negotiation, it is
questionable whether a United States plaintiff has access to United
States courts. This prospect seems to run contrary to the spirit
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),' which is in-
tended to give United States citizens the greatest opportunity possi-
ble to litigate if they have a valid claim against a foreign sovereign.
Unfortunately for many would-be litigants, a substantial number
of plaintiffs never get the opportunity to argue their case on its
merits because the connection between the foreign defendant and
the United States is found to be too tenuous. The courts have ap-
plied the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe v.
Washington' and its progeny very conservatively when the defen-
dant is a foreign state or corporation acting in a commercial capa-
city. This "minimum contacts" test requires that a defendant must
have availed himself of the "benefits and protections" of the forum's
laws before he is subject to suit in the forum.' This restrictive
approach discourages a United States citizen who wants to take
advantage of international business transactions and trade but who
is hesitant to enter into any such arrangement without the assur-
ance of a forum in the event of a dispute.
This Note will focus on minimum contacts and the difficulties
a plaintiff faces in trying to establish the jurisdictional requirements
of the FSIA in a dispute. The problems of applying United States
minimum contacts standards in international litigation will be ex-
plored, as well as the differing judicial views on what "minimum
contacts" means. In addition, the Note will look at the future of
the minimum contacts standard and whether that standard can
survive as a viable FSIA tool.
' Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, codified at
28 U.S.C. SS 1330; 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4); 1391(f); 1441(d); and 1602-1611 (1976). [hereinafter cited
as F.S.I.A.].
2 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 319.
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II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. An Overview
The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in the philosoph-
ical works of Bodin during the sixteenth century." The influence
of writers in this period, coupled with the lack of governmental
activity in commercial ventures, gave rise to the doctrine of ab-
solute sovereign immunity under which no state could be subject
to the commands of another state.' The absolute theory was given
judicial support in two pioneer cases decided within eight years
of each other on different sides of the Atlantic: The Schooner
Exchange,' an American decision; and The Prins Frederik,7 a British
decision. Under these interpretations a foreign state or its instru-
mentality enjoyed immunity from lawsuits in the courts of another
sovereign!s
The absolute doctrine prevailed in both jurisdictions well into
the twentieth century.' In Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro," the
United States courts had the opportunity to reexamine the doc-
trine in light of increasing international trade conducted by foreign
governmental commercial enterprises. The case dealt with a libel
in rem action brought for cargo damages against a merchant vessel
owned and operated by the Italian government. The Supreme Court
ruled that absolute sovereignty would continue, reasoning that pro-
viding revenue for a national treasury through trade constituted
J. BODIN, THE Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 43 (M. Tooley transl. 1955).
See Marasinghe, A Reassessment of Sovereign Immunity, 9 OTTAWA L. REV. 474, 475
(1977), for an excellent history of absolute sovereign immunity.
6 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Chief Justice John
Marshall, in writing for the Court, relied primarily on the writings of Bynkershoek and
Vattel for justifying the absolute doctrine. A great deal of case law, put forth by counsel
in briefs and arguments, was not used in the opinion. Thus, the United States policy on
sovereign immunity for 140 years was based upon the views of two seventhteenth century
political philosophers.
2 Dods. 451, 165 E.R. 1543 (H.C. of Adm. 1820).
Marassinghe, supra note 5, at 474.
The British courts at one time considered modifications of the absolute doctrine in
situations where a government was acting in a commercial capacity. In the Parlement Beige,
[1879] 4 P.D. 129, Sir Robert Pellimore distinguished a government's public acts from its
private acts and asserted there could be no immunity for the latter. The decision was revers-
ed on appeal [1880] 5 P.D. 197. Great Britain continues to adhere to the doctrine of ab-
solute sovereign immunity, though recent cases evidence a move away from this practice.
See Thai Europe Tapicoa Service Ltd. v. Gov't of Pakistan, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1485 (C.A.),
[1975] 3 All E.R. 961; Philippine Admiral (Owners) v. Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong Ltd.),
[1976] 2 W.L.R. 214 (P.C.), [1976] 1 All E.R. 78; Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria [1952] 1 Q.B. 529, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881.
" 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
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a public purpose." This analysis continued to be used in pre-World
War II sovereignty cases.'2
Prior to 1976, American sovereign immunity determinations were
based on State Department recommendations to the courts on how
individual cases should be handled. The rationale behind this pro-
cedure was that these matters were questions of foreign policy
and thus exclusively within the domain of the executive branch.'3
The State Department continued to follow the doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity despite the Supreme Court's language in
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman (The Baja California),'4 where the
Department chose not to make a recommendation. The Supreme
Court's decision turned upon the distinction between possession
and title of a foreign vessel, the Court ruling that mere title held
by the government was not enough to uphold the defendant's sov-
ereign-immunity claim.'" The extensive dicta by the Court on the
sovereign immunity issue showed a willingness to dismiss the im-
munity claim even if the vessel had been in the possession of the
Mexican government; however, the majority emphasized that the
judiciary should not embarrass another governmental branch by
making a ruling contrary to State Department policy.'"
The absolute sovereign immunity doctrine was abandoned by
the State Department in the "Tate Letter" of 1952.1 In the Tate
Letter, the State Department recognized a distinction between the
public and private acts of foreign governments and refused im-
munity for actions based on private, commercial acts.'8 The deci-
sion to change was based partially on political considerations (in
that the United States was subjecting itself continually to litiga-
tion in countries that were absolutely immune from United States
courts) and partially based on the practical need for United States
citizens to have access to a forum when attempting to settle dis-
putes with foreign commercial entities. 9 This position was referred
to as the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity. 0
" Id. at 574.
See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, SA. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
13 T. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 14 (1970).
" 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
"s Id. at 38.
Id. at 35.
" Letter from Acting Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Phillip
B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
The restrictive doctrine was codified in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),"1 which transfers control of immun-
ity determinations from the State Department to the federal courts
in an effort to ensure that all decisions are based purely on legal
grounds and not on administration policy.' Given a United States
plaintiff seeking a forum in the United States against a foreign
state, 3 the initial determination to be made is whether that state
is immune from the jurisdiction of a United States court under
the terms of the FSIA. Once it is established that there is no im-
munity, jurisdiction may be exercised over the foreign state only
in accordance with due process of law under the United States
Constitution.24
The FSIA provides a number of exceptions to sovereign im-
munity in sections 1605 to 1607. One example of these exceptions
is found in section 1605(a)(2), which states that a foreign state shall
not be immune as a sovereign from United States jurisdiction when
suit is brought against the state for an act performed "... outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States. 25 The court initially must deter-
mine if the foreign state acted in a commercial nature;" if so, the
court then determines if that activity caused a direct effect in the
United States. Once commercial activity and direct effects are es-
tablished, the foreign state is not immune as a sovereign to
jurisdiction.
Even after the foreign state's claim of sovereign immunity is
defeated, the exercise of jurisdiction is proper only if the defendant
state has met the requisite "minimum contacts" with the forum
such that due process of law is not denied the defendant. 7 The
FSIA provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants in section 1330(b).1
21 F.S.I.A., supra note 1.
See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1976), reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORTS].
" The F.S.I.A. defines a foreign state as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumen-
tality of the state, 28 U.S.C. S 1603(a) (1976).
28 U.S.C. S 1330(b) (1976).
28 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(2) (1976).
28 U.S.C. S 1603(d) (1976).
HOUSE REPORTS, supra note 22, at 6612.




A. Applying National Standards to International Disputes
The concept of minimum contacts embodied in section 1330(b)
of the FSIA is based upon due process limitations, as defined by
the Supreme Court in International Shoe v. Washington' and McGee
v. International Life Insurance Co.,3" and by Congress in the long
arm statute for the District of Columbia." According to Interna-
tional Shoe, the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
is proper when his activities within the forum are such that he
enjoys the "benefits and protections of the laws of that state.3 2
If the defendant is not physically present within the forum, his
contacts in the forum must be significant enough that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction is not unjust. 3
In International Shoe, a company located outside of the State
of Washington employed salesmen to enter the State and solicit
orders for shoes. The State of Washington sought to require the
company to pay into the state unemployment compensation fund.
The defendant maintained that it was not amenable to personal
jurisdiction in Washington courts because it maintained no office
in the State and never made contracts for the sale or purchase
of goods in the State.' Justice Stone, writing for the majority,
stated that in analyzing whether the exercise of jurisdiction met
the demands of due process, the Court must determine if the con-
tacts made with the forum were sufficient to make it "reasonable"
to bring the defendant into the Washington court.35 In making this
n 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
" D.C. CODE ANN. S 13-423 (1970).
S 13423 Personal Jurisdiction Based upon Conduct
(a) The District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from
the persons:
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia.
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted
against him.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319 (1945).
Id. at 316.
" The shoe company supplied each salesman with one shoe out of a pair in a line of
design samples. The salesmen's only duties were to display the shoes to buyers and solicit
orders. The orders were sent out-of-state to the company's St. Louis office where they
were filled and shipped F.O.B. into Washington. The salemen were not authorized to make
contracts or collect money from their customers.
' International shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319 (1945).
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determination, the inconvenience to the defendant in coming to
the forum should be considered.' The Court noted that the satisfac-
tion of due process depends upon "the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws."37 Justice Stone concluded that the shoe company, through
its regular contacts with Washington, conducted a large amount of
business within the state and received the benefits and protections
of the laws of Washington. Therefore, the requirements of due pro-
cess were met in the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant.
The second case that influenced Congress in the promulgation
of section 1330(b) of the FSIA was McGee v. International Life In-
surance Co.' This is a controversial case: some courts interpret
it as a statement of the outermost limits on the exercise of long
arm jurisdiction; 9 others interpret it as an aberration, limited in
its application to life insurance contracts."0 In McGee, an insurer
mailed a life insurance policy to the insured in California, receiv-
ed premium payments from the insured in California, and then,
after the insured's death, refused to pay the beneficiary. The
Supreme Court held that California could enter a binding judg-
ment on the insurer within the limits of due process because "the
suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with
that State."" The substantial contact turned on the nature of the
contract. The policy was mailed into California, the premiums were
paid from California and the insured was a resident of California
when he died. The Court balanced the state's interests against the
defendant's inconvenience and found that the state's interest "in
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims"' outweighed the defendant's inconve-
nience. Consequently, there was no denial of due process.'"
Id. at 317.
3, Id. at 319. Justice Stone went on to say:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of the
state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state,
a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to en-
force them can in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
Id.
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
" See infra notes 78-87 and the text to which they pertain.
See infra note 80 and the text to which it pertains.
" McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. at 223 (1957).
42 Id.
," Id. at 224. The Court noted that from the holding in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877), where the defendant's physical presence in the forum was essential to the exercise
214 [Vol. 12:209
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Seven months after deciding McGee, the Supreme Court clarified
its policy on minimum contacts in Hanson v. Denckla." Hanson also
dealt with contracts sent through the mail from one state to
another. The Court distinguished the situation in Hanson from
that in McGee: in Hanson the foreign defendant had not solicited
the plaintiffs business in the forum, nor was there any "act done
or transaction consummated in the forum State."'" The Court also
noted that the state interest in McGee was put forth explicitly in
a statute that expressed the state's interest in providing redress
to residents injured by nonresidents in areas subject to state regula-
tion. The Court concluded that "it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"" and refused
to permit the exercise of jurisdiction.
The standards developed by the Supreme Court in International
Shoe, McGee and Hanson were highly influential on state courts
as the states began parring and interpreting long arm statutes.
Illinois was quick to promulgate a long arm statute based upon
International Shoe that was "in line with the general trend to
expand jurisdiction over non-residents having contacts, ties, or rela-
tions with the State."'7 In both tort and contract cases, interpreta-
tions of the Illinois statute were broad, pushing the exercise of
jurisdiction to the limits of due process.
In Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,"
the Illinois Supreme Court approved the exercise of jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant who had had no physical presence within
the state, but who had shipped defective goods into Illinois. By
not requiring the physical presence of the defendant in the forum,
the court freed itself from the outdated standard announced in
of jurisdiction, to International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the scope of jurisdiction had ex-
panded significantly. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. at 222. The Supreme
Court attributed this expansion to the increase in interstate commerce:
With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in
the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time
modern transportation and communication have made it less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself in a state where he engages in economic activity.
Id. at 223.
"357 U.S. 235 (1958).
" Id. at 251.
" Id. at 253.
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, S 17(l)(a) (Joint Committee Comments (1)) (Smith-Hurd 1956).
8 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961).
19821 215
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
1877 in Pennoyer v. Neff,9 and began to apply the International
Shoe standard. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the frequency
and relative ease of shipping goods from state to state had effec-
tively "effaced the economic significance of state lines" and removed
the inconvenience of defending lawsuits in foreign jurisdictions.10
As the technology of transportation had developed and made inter-
state commerce a prevalent form of American business, this court
broadened its standard for the exercise of jurisdiction to one that
essentially equated the presence of the defendant's goods with the
actual presence of the defendant.
In Koplin v. Thomas, Haab and Botts5 personal jurisdiction was
exercised over New York defendants who had placed advertise-
ments in Chicago newspapers, sent agents to Illinois to conduct
seminars about option contracts, offered and sold put and call op-
tions to Illinois residents and registered with the Secretary of State
to do business in Illinois. Although the defendants had no office
in the state, did not sell options through agents in the state, and
actually made all sales in New York, the court held that their ac-
tivities in the state constituted transacting business and invoked
the benefits and protection of the laws of Illinois. The court noted
that the defendants could "reasonably anticipate that litigation
might arise from the sales"'' because they conducted a large volume
of business in the state. Illinois had a significant interest in pro-
viding a forum for residents seeking a remedy for a nonresident's
violation of a state statute. Consequently, it was not unfair to com-
pel the defendants to come to Illinois to defend the suit.
In Cook Associates, Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Machine,5 a single
business transaction initiated by the nonresident defendant by tele-
4' 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Court held that "It~he authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the state in which it is established ...." Id. at 720.
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.
2d at 766. The Court went on to say:
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may have been
reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to reality, and in-
justice rather than justice is promoted. Our changing principles of justice, whether
procedural or substantive in nature, should be scrupulously observed by the courts.
But the rules of law which grow and develop within those principles must do
so in the light of facts of economic life as it is lived today. Otherwise the need
for adaptation may become so great that basic rights are sacrificed in the name
of reform, and the principles themselves become impaired.
Id. at 443, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
St 73 Ill. App. 2d 242, 219 N.E. 2d 646 (1966).
Id. at 252, 219 N.E. 2d at 651.
14 Ill. App. 3d 965, 304 N.E. 2d 27 (1973).
216 [Vol. 12:209
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phone was sufficient to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion. The defendant entered into a contract with an Illinois company.
That contract was performed in Illinois and its validity was
governed by Illinois law. Therefore, the court found that due pro-
cess was satisfied when the foreign defendant was required to come
to Illinois to litigate. "Although defendant's only contact within
this state was a telephone call, that call was all that was necessary
for defendant to achieve its purpose."' 5
These Illinois cases do not turn on whether the defendant was
physically present in the forum. Given the case of modern communi-
cations and shipping, minimum contacts with the forum can be es-
tablished without physical presence. In tort cases, the shipping
of goods into the forum gives a sufficient basis for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. In contract
cases, if the defendant initiates the transaction and the contract
is performed in the forum, the nonresident may be called into the
forum to defend.
Other jurisdictions have interpreted their long arm statutes very
broadly. The long arm statute for the District of Columbia, the
third foundation for section 1330(b) of the FSIA, was derived in-
directly from Illinois' long arm statute.' In Margoles v. Johns,s the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated
in dicta that in some cases minimum contacts are established under
the "transacting business" provisions when the contracts were made
Id. at 970, 304 N.E. 2d at 31. The plaintiff was an employment agency that sent resume
flyers to prospective employers for one of its clients. A Delaware corporation called the
plaintiff and requested the information about the client. Before releasing any information,
the plaintiff requested a fee for its services and the defendant agreed to pay. Subsequently,
plaintiff arranged interviews between the two parties (not located in Illinois) and the client
was hired. Because there was an oral contract made, which the defendant initiated by
telephone, and the contract was performed in Illinois, jurisdiction was exercised. See also
Oce-Industries, Inc. v. Coleman, 487 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. fI1. 1980) (where defendant initiated
hundreds of telephone calls placing orders for the plaintiff's goods); Tabor & Co. v. McNall,
30 11. App. 3d 593, 333 N.E.2d 562 (1975) (where contract, negotiated by phone, was partially
performed); Colony Press, Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 Ill. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E. 2d 78 (1974) (where
defendant ordered newspaper inserts by telephone, returned corrected copy, and accepted
F.O.B. Chicago terms).
m D.C. CODE ANN. S 13-423, supra note 30. The legislative history indicates that the expan-
sive bases of jurisdiction found in the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act
were models for the District of Columbia statute. S. REP. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35
(1969) and H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1970). Section 1.03(a)(1) of the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over
a person who transacts any business within the forum. This section was derived from the
Illinois long-arm statute. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT 1.03(aX1)
Commissioner's Note at 310 (1962).
483 F.2d 1212 (U.S. App. D.C. 1973).
1982]
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by telephone calls.57 The court noted that the provisions generally
are interpreted as limited only by the due process considerations
set forth in International Shoe, McGee, and Hanson. In 1974, the
District Court, citing Margoles v. Johns, exercised jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant who had ratified a contract by telephone be-
tween two parties present in the forum, Dorothy K. Winston &
Co. v. Toum Heights Development, Inc.' The contract was initiated
by the defendant, formed in the District of Columbia and was to
be performed partially in the forum.
The Oregon Supreme Court, in 1960, ruled that where a contract
for the shipment of lumber from Oregon to Georgia was made "[o]n
the strength of a telephoned offer and acceptance" and resulted
in one shipment of lumber out of the forum, the defendant had signi-
ficant contacts with the forum. An Oregon court could exercise
jurisdiction over this defendant in State ex rel. White Lumber Sales,
Inc. v. Sulmonetti.5 The defendant had received and paid for one
shipment of lumber, but a dispute had arisen over the quality of
the wood.
In Parke-Barnat Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn,' the Court of Ap-
peals of New York held that where the foreign defendant had re-
quested an open telephone line to an auction in New York and
thereby placed high bids on two paintings and was considered the
purchaser of those paintings, he had engaged in purposeful activity
within the state. Personal jurisdiction was exercised over the defen-
dant, not because he had placed a single order over the telephone,
but because he had become an active participant in the auction
as a result of the open telephone line.1
In Market & Distribution Resources, Inc. v. Paccar, Inc.,62 the
Massachusetts long arm statute was held to require a Delaware
corporation to come to Massachusetts for litigation stemming from
a breach of contract with a Massachusetts corporation; although the
defendant was never physically present in the forum. The court
51 Id. at 1218. The plaintiff in this case was suing an out-of-state newspaper for slander.
The court ruled that the tort provisions of the longarm statute were not as far-reaching
as those for breach of contract actions.
58 376 F. Supp. 1214 (D.D.C. 1974).
s State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968).
60 26 N.Y. 2d 13, 256 N.E. 2d 506, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (1970).
11 As dictum in this case, the court stated that the exercise of personal jurisdiction also
could be based upon the fact that an employee of the plaintiff had acted as an agent of
the defendant by making the bids for him and describing the auction to him as it progressed.
Id. at 18, 256 N.E. 2d at 509, 308 N.Y.S. at 342.
"2 460 F. Supp. 990 (D. Mass. 1978).
[Vol. 12:209218
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found that the defendant had established the requisite contacts
with the forum by negotiating a contract through calls and corre-
spondence, contemplating that the contract would be performed
within the forum, and directing the plaintiff to mail the product
of the contract outside of the forum to the defendant's distributors.
These contacts were deemed sufficient to forewarn the defendant
that it might be called into the forum for litigation. The court noted
that the defendant could have sued the plaintiff in Massachusetts,
if the plaintiff had failed to perform, and concluded that the defen-
dant purposefully had availed itself of the benefits and privileges
of doing business in the State of Massachusetts.
In the cases discussed above, the foreign defendant was never
physically present within the forum, but he initiated contact with
the plaintiff, formed a contract that was performed in the forum
and then breached that contract. The defendant used telephone
and mail communications purposefully and significantly to affect
the plaintiff in the forum. The contact by mail or phone was not
the key. The courts looked instead to the effect of the contact to
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent defendant was proper.
Some courts do not require contract performance within the
forum for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In Southern Idaho
Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
of Idaho found that its long arm statute (patterned after the Illinois
statute) extended jurisdiction over a California based corporation
that operated for years in Idaho through mail and telephone ad-
vertisements of its products. The defendant sold its products to
Idaho buyers, but the buyer was responsible for shipping the goods
from California to Idaho. In this case, a contract was negotiated
by telephone and mail, the plaintiff shipped some of the defendant's
goods into the forum and then the defendant refused to make the
product available again, thereby violating the terms of the con-
tract. The court found that the key to exercising jurisdiction over
the defendant was not that its products entered the forum, but that
the defendant had initiated sales transactions in the forum for a
number of years with the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit."
In Hoster v. Monongahela Steel Corp.,' the United States District
Court ruled that Oklahoma's long arm statute allowed the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who had initiated
,' 98 Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977).
Id. at 497, 567 P.2d at 1248.
492 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D. Ok. 1980).
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negotiations with the plaintiff for the sale of steel bars to the plain-
tiff. The defendant made telephone calls and corresponded through
the mail to negotiate a contract. Although the defendant argued
that no contract was made, the court found sufficient contacts with
the forum in the "totality of contacts" and the purposeful initia-
tion of negotiations with the plaintiff."
The Idaho and Oklahoma cases indicate that purposeful initiation
of negotiations with a plaintiff within the forum may be enough
to satisfy due process requirements for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. The impact on the plaintiff within the forum is just
as significant whether it is caused by telephone, mail, or personal
negotiations. That impact coupled with the defendant's purposeful
activity fulfill the due process requirements of International Shoe,
McGee and Hanson.
There are a number of courts that have rejected this expan-
sion of minimum contacts. Even where the nonresident defendant
has solicited the plaintiffs business and delivered his product into
the forum, jurisdiction has been denied.67 In Lakeside Bridge & Steel
Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., where the defendant ini-
tiated contact with the plaintiff and ordered goods from him, the
Seventh Circuit held the defendant had not invoked the benefits
and protections of the laws of the forum." In addition, jurisdiction
usually is denied if the plaintiff has initiated all the contacts with
the foreign defendant, and these contacts were made by mail or
telephone. 9
Since the 1958 Hanson v. Denckla decision, the Supreme Court
has ruled in four cases that are regarded as a retrenchment from
earlier decisions. In 1977, the court decided Shaffer v. Heitner,0
Id. at 1253.
V Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965). The third party
defendant had solicited business in New York by mail, negotiated with the buyer by mail,
delivered samples into New York, sent a purchase order to the plaintiff, and delivered
115 tons of walnut shells into the forum.
" Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir. 1979).
" Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); Frank E. Basil,
Inc. v. Guardino, 424 A.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Koster v. Automark Industries, Inc.
640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981) (eight letters, a telegram, and transatlantic call into the forum
were not sufficient when the contract was executed in Italy and the goods were manufac-
tured in Switzerland); Aaron Ferer & Sons, Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d
450 (8th Cir. 1977) (the contracts were not to be performed in Nebraska, nor were the
goods originating in or destined for the forum; Empresa Nacional Siderurgica v. Glazer
Steel Co., 503 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (calls and telexes were between the steel pro-
ducer's sales manager in New York and the chief executive officer of the buyer, who trans-
acted business in Louisiana and Texas).
70 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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which held that even when a foreign defendant has acted within
the forum state in some capacity, that act must be related directly
to the cause of action and must avail the defendent of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum before the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over that defendant is proper. 1 In Kulko v.
Superior Court of California,2 the Court stated that the defendant
must receive or expect to receive a benefit by his activities in the
forum state, such that the forum has a substantial interest in exer-
cising jurisdiction over the defendant. These two cases illustrate
the Court's shift of emphasis away from the impact on the plain-
tiff to the activities and expectations of the defendant. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson73 and Rush v. Savchuk" represent a
revitalization of the concepts of federalism. In these cases, the Court
emphasized that states must guard against overextending their
boundaries in exercising jurisdiction over residents of other states.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court delineated two functions
of the minimum contacts concept. First, a minimum contacts stan-
dard guards against unduly burdening the defendant with litiga-
tion in a distant forum. Second, minimum contacts are "to ensure
that the States . . .do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system."75
Rush v. Savchuk emphasized that in analyzing whether due pro-
cess will be served by the exercise of jurisdiction, the court must
concentrate on the relationships among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation."
To determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would over-
burden the foreign defendant, the Court balanced the burden
against other factors. These factors were the interests of 1) the
forum state in the litigation, 2) the plaintiff in obtaining relief, 3)
the judicial system in efficient dispute resolution and 4) the other
states in encouraging social policies. The Court noted that these
interests may not outweigh the Due Process Clause if the doctrine
of interstate federalism is violated by an overextension of one
state's authority over another. The defendant, by his conduct and
activities within the forum, must "reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there."' Using these tests, the Court in World-Wide
"' Id. at 216.
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
13 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
7, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
" World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
7 Rush v. Savehuk, 444 U.S. at 327.
" World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
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Volkswagen held that the sale of an automobile to persons in New
York, who were later injured in that automobile in Oklahoma (where
the seller did no business) was not a sufficient contact with Okla-
homa to subject the seller to the jurisdiction of its courts. The
Court said that if the car had been sold because of the seller's
efforts to market its product in the forum state, then the exercise
of jurisdiction would have been proper.
These four decisions do not necessitate a different outcome in
the cases discussed earlier. World-Wide Volkswagen did not involve
direct shipment of goods into the forum to a resident who then
was injured by the product. Nor did these four cases involve con-
tracts initiated by foreign defendants and then performed in the
forum. The exercise of jurisdiction in the cases noted initially was
based on purposeful activity by the defendant in the forum. All
of the factors that counterbalance the burden on the foreign defen-
dant can be present in the kinds of contract and tort actions the
earlier cases described.
One decision that has analyzed minimum contacts in a breach
of contract action and utilized the standards articulated in those
recent Supreme Court cases is Alchemie International, Inc. v. Metal
World, Inc.5 In this case, the United States District Court of New
Jersey adopted a broad interpretation of McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co.,"9 refusing to limit the reach of jurisdiction by
the characterization of the contract." The court noted that some
authorities have interpreted McGee as being limited to life insurance
policies,"1 but accepted a broader interpretation. According to the
court, Hanson v. Denckla distinguishes McGee as involving a defen-
dant who has invoked the benefits and protections of the forum's
laws by purposefully soliciting a contract in that state. By doing
this, the defendant has subjected himself to the forum state's ju-
risdiction. 2 McGee was not tied only to the state's special interest
regarding insurance policies, argues Alchemie. The state statute
11 523 F. Supp. 1039 (D. N. J. 1981). Through the mailing of papers into the forum and
certain telephone conversations, the defendant agreed to sell and the plaintiff agreed to
buy a large quantity of molybdenum oxide material.
" 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Alchemie International, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. at 1048. But see Vencedor
Manufacturing Co. v. Gougler Industries, Inc., 557 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1977); Lakeside Bridge
& Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979); Trippe Manufac-
turing Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959); Frank E. Basil, Inc. v. Guar-
dino, 424 A.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (where McGee is construed narrowly, applicable only to
insurance contracts).




governing jurisdiction over insurance disputes was passed after
the contract had been entered into by the parties; thus, the defen-
dant's only notice that he may have been subject to California's
jurisdiction was the fact that he solicited the contract."
The contract in Alchemie was solicited, negotiated and executed
through the use of telephone and mail contacts. No products ever
entered the forum. The defendant argued that the telephone and
mail contacts were not sufficient to constitute minimum contacts.
The court said the important factor was not the mode of entering
into the contract, but the solicitation of the contract itself and
whether that met the due process standards.84
Alchemie incorporated the values of federalism; thus a state
must have an interest in the litigation with its territory, and that
interest must outweigh any interest of the defendant's state. Given
a state interest, it also must be substantially fair to the defendant
to require his defense in the forum. These rather nebulous policies,
often called the "twin limitations,"" are fundamental to the idea
of minimum contacts." In Alchemie, the court concluded that "any
rational state interest will be sufficient;" therefore, the interests
in providing a forum for its residents (a stated goal of the FSIA)
and holding persons responsible for their contractual obligations
with state residents were deemed sufficient. 7
In addition, the defendant was found to have availed himself pur-
posefully of the privilege of conducting business in New Jersey by
soliciting the contract. That finding was militated by an agreement
that New Jersey law would govern the performance of the contract.
Given the defendant's purposeful contact with the state, he was held
to have been able to anticipate being called to the forum. There-
fore, it was not unfair to require him to litigate in New Jersey.
Id. at 1049.
8, The court stated:
Indeed, a refusal to acknowledge the fashion in which modern business is con-
ducted and the increasingly dominant role played in that conduct by mail and
telephone communications is as much a return to the shibboleths of Pennoyer
v. Neff [citations omitted], long abandoned by the Court .... as would resurrec-
tion of the notion that a defendant must be present within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a court before its judgment will bind him. I therefore count the defen-
dant's calls and mail communications to plaintiff as significant contacts with the
State of New Jersey.
Id. at 1050.
' Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1140 (3d Cir. 1976); Empire Abrasive
Equipment Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1977).
' Alchemic International, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. at 1044-46.
"7 Id. at 1046.
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This notice of potential litigation was found to satisfy World-Wide
Volkswagen's concern for fairness to the defendant.
Applying some of the tests described above for minimum con-
tacts, section 1130(b) of the FSIA could be broadened to encom-
pass foreign sovereigns that contact United States citizens by mail,
telephone, or telex. If the defendant initiates contacts within the
United States, such that he purposefully enters into a contract
and anticipates the receipt of economic benefits from that contact,
jurisdiction in the United States courts would be appropriate. The
circumstances of each case would have to be analyzed carefully
in balancing the defendant's burden and the concepts of national
sovereignty against the United States interests invoked by the dis-
pute. The United States does have an interest in providing its
citizens with a forum and in holding foreign defendants to obliga-
tions purposefully made with United States citizens. Given the care
with which World-Wide Volkswagen emphasized that the defendant
must not be burdened unduly by litigation in a distant forum, cases
involving foreign governments as defendants would be difficult.
However, the interests of the United States are very important
in these cases and in many instances the exercise of jurisdiction
would be proper.
B. Minimum Contacts in FSIA Cases
The American judiciary has dealt with minimum contacts in
domestic disputes since 1945,88 and the recent decisions of Shafer
v. Heitner,9 Kulko v. Superior Court," World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson,91 and Rush v. Savchuk2 indicate a continuing commitment
on the part of the Supreme Court to adapt that standard to a chang-
ing world. The Court has not had the opportunity to address the
role of minimum contacts in international disputes under the FSIA.
That task has been left to the lower federal courts. In most FSIA
cases, minimum contacts has not been the dispositive issue upon
which jurisdiction was decided;93 however, the decisions address-
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
89 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
" 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
92 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
"3 See Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Elextrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C.
1977) (plaintiff not the real party in interest); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.,
62 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant's actions not related to the specific transaction of
business sued upon); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (defendant not a commercial entity).
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ing minimum contacts indicate that the courts are exercising cau-
tion in their new role as forums for international litigation.
In advocating judicial reliance on minimum contacts to determine
jurisdiction,' Congress allowed the courts great discretion in analyz-
ing FSIA cases. Since the Act's passage in 1976, the judiciary has
interpreted its jurisdictional provisions in differing ways. As a
result, there is not a well established standard available for deter-
mining whether jurisdiction can be exercised over the foreign de-
fendant and plaintiffs are unsure as to how their case will be
treated. 5
Most of the early FSIA decisions read the statute narrowly and
required physical presence of the defendant in the United States
before the exercise of jurisdiction was granted. In Carey v. Na-
tional Petroleum Corp.,9 the plaintiff corporation marketed
petroleum products pursuant to an agreement with Libya. In 1973
Libya nationalized its oilfields, cutting off the oil supply to the
plaintiff who was forced to breach contracts with United States
utilities. Since the contact with the forum consisted only of oil ship-
ments into the United States, the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the action against the
Libyan oil company, noting that the embargo did not reach the
"level" of minimum contacts. 7
That same court decided East Europe Domestic International
Sales Corp. v. Terra,98 a 1979 case that followed the restrictive
approach. The plaintiff, a New York corporation, negotiated a con-
tract in Romania with the defendant. The parties negotiated
changes in the agreement via overseas telex, but the defendant
never physically entered the United States. The court determined
that the Romanian corporation was not amenable to American juris-
diction because it had no continuous and systematic relationship
with the forum and no physical presence within the forum."
In Waukesha Engine Division, Dresser Americas, Inc. v. Banco
HOUSE REPORTS, supra note 22, at 6612.
9 "In structure, the F.S.I.A. is a marvel of compression .... [Ilt purports to provide
answers to three crucial questions in a suit against a foreign state: the availability of
sovereign immunity as a defense, the presence of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim,
and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the defendant .... This economy of deci-
sion has come, however, at the price of considerable confusion in the district courts." Texas
Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
453 F. Supp. 1097 (2d Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 1101.
98 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Id. at 387.
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Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo,0 the contacts of the defendant
Mexican banking institution with the forum were limited to a single
inspection visit by bank officers. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin refused to exercise jurisdiction because the
single visit was a "minor additional contact" which was not suffi-
cient for minimum contacts.1 ' The court used the Wisconsin long
arm statute rather than the FSIA to support its holding.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no basis for jurisdic-
tion in Thomas P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produc-
cion de Costa Rica,02 a case involving a California plaintiff and a
Costa Rican defendant. The court based its decision on the long
arm statute of California, treating the Costa Rican corporation as
if it were an American corporation.103 The defendant was found
not to be amenable to suit even though it regularly entered into
sales and purchase agreements with the plaintiff and made pay-
ment in California by confirmed letters of credit. The court noted
that the defendant had no office, place of business, or property
in the forum, and that this precluded California jurisdiction." ' The
court's language concerning a contact without physical presence
is especially interesting: "The Consejo validly argues that use of
the mails, telephone, or other international communication simply
do not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and pro-
tections of the state."105
The court for the Northern District of Illinois refused to exer-
cise jurisdiction in Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, '6 where the only communication between the contracting
parties had been by telex messages and the defendant had never
entered the forum. Chicago Bridge represented a slight departure
from previous decisions in that it was decided solely by utilizing
the FSIA rather than analogizing to state statute. 7 In determin-
ing what constituted minimum contacts, the court noted that numer-
ous visits by agents of a foreign instrumentality to the forum for
inspection could establish prerequisite minimum contacts.108
100 485 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
" Id. at 493.
'02 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980).
103 Id. at 1251.
104 Id. at 1253-54.
... Id. at 1254.
506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. II. 1980).
107 Id. at 988.
108 Id. at 989.
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In Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Saline Cruz,'°9 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals again addressed the jurisdictional
provision of the FSIA. This time the court had the guidance of
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, ' ° and the reasoning of the deci-
sion reflects a more careful analysis than did the Thomas P. Gon-
zales decision of two years before. The case involved a Washington
plaintiff who had bought a boat and had repairs made on it at the
defendant's Mexican marina. When the boat sank off the coast of
Alaska, the plaintiff filed suit.
The court looked to seven factors, taken from World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, Hanson v. Denckla,' and McGee v. Inter-
national Life Insurance Co. ,",2 to determine the "reasonableness"
of exercising jurisdiction. These included:
a) the extent of purposeful interjection into the forum state...;
b) the burden of the defendant of defending in the forum ...
c) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants'
state ...;
d) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute ...
e) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy ...
f) the importance of the forum to the plaintiffs interest in con-
venient and effective relief . . ;
g) the existance of an alternative forum."'
After applying these factors to the facts of the case, the court
refused to exercise jurisdiction.
In Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,"4 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals faced the complicated aftermaths of
Nigeria's port closing in 1975. The plaintiff brought the action
against the government of Nigeria for anticipatory breach of a con-
tract for the defendant's purchase of cement from the plaintiffs.
The court used a four step approach to determine if jurisdiction
could be exercised:115 first, to what extent did the defendant avail
itself of the benefits and privileges of American laws; second, to
what extent could the defendant have foreseen the instigation of
litigation in the United States; third, how inconvenient would it
be for the defendant to litigate in the United States; and fourth,
649 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1981).
,Io 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
.. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
11 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
,,1 649 F.2d at 1270.
11 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
", Id. at 314.
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what interests would the United States have in hearing the case.
The court concluded that the defendants had availed themselves
sufficiently of the benefits of United States law by arranging to
have the goods paid for in the United States."6 The very fact that
they had made such arrangements indicated that the defendant could
have foreseen a dispute leading to litigation in the United States.'
The court found that it would not necessarily be inconvenient to
come to the United States for the suit, as the defendants had con-
tracted with many nations for cement and had agreed to arbitra-
tion through the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris
should a dispute arise."8 Finally, the court concluded that the United
States had an interest in providing redress for her citizens and
corporations when involved in disputes with foreign states."9 This
fact was evidenced by the very existence of the FSIA.'2"
Within three months after the expansive decision of Texas
Trading, the District Court for the District of Columbia decided
Gilson v. Republic of Ireland.' The plaintiff was an American citizen
who allegedly was induced by a private Irish corporation via mail,
telex, and telephone to enter into a commercial venture in Ireland.
After the plaintiff moved to Ireland, the corporation breached the
contract and converted the plaintiff's patents and equipment to
its own use. The plaintiff sued for damages against the corpora-
tion, another corporation which joined the conversion, the Republic
of Ireland, and an Irish governmental agency that promoted Irish
investment.
The focus of the pleadings dealt with the activities of the Irish
corporation, the plaintiff basing his claim on the defendant's use
of mail, telephone, and telegraph to negotiate for his employ-
ment.'" After Texas Trading carefully evaluated the jurisdictional
provisions of section 1330(b),'2 Gibson followed the reasoning of
earlier courts and adhered to a restrictive interpretation of
minimum contacts. Such a holding does not uphold the intent of
Congress, and the ruling in Texas Trading, that the FSIA be used
"6 Id. at 314-15. Note the contrast between this and Thomas P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo
Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980).




517 F. Supp. 477 (D.D.C. 1981).
"' Id. at 484.
'23 28 U.S.C. i 1330(b) (1976).
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to give greater access to the federal court system to those wrong-
ed by foreign states.
IV. THE FUTURE OF MINIMUM CONTACTS AND THE
REACH OF THE FSIA
The minimum contacts standard applied in the FSIA cases is
more restrictive than that applied in domestic cases. Within the
United States, the concept of minimum contacts has expanded be-
yond the requirement of physical presence in the forum. This seems
to have been acknowledged by the federal appeals courts in Marina
Salina and Texas Trading; yet the federal district courts continue
to look to physical presence as a determinative factor in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction. Jurisdiction based upon the
physical presence standard severely restricts the plaintiff's access
to United States courts. Such an interpretation is contrary to the
purpose of the FSIA, given the increase in contractual relations
between United States and foreign businesses made by mail,
telephone, and telex.
One possible reason for the different standards in FSIA cases
is that the court are making determinations that formerly were
made by the executive branch. '24 It is understandable that they
might be cautious in their early decisions; however, this caution
runs contrary to the broad congressional mandate given the judici-
ary to deal with FSIA disputes. '25 This restrictive interpretation
of minimum contacts is not reflective of domestic decisions, which
are beginning to recognize the validity of contacts other than physi-
cal presence."' In essence, the courts have created two minimum
contacts tests: a domestic test, reflective of contemporary business
practices, and an FSIA test.
There is no reason for this distinction between international and
domestic defendants. The physical presence preference in inter-
national cases is reminiscent of Pennoyer v. Neff, '27 a case that was
put to rest in 1945. ' Domestic decisions have realized that elec-
tronic communication can be incorporated safely into our notions
of "fair play and substantial justice"'" without diminishing the
validity of the due process standards now employed. FSIA cases
'4 See supra text p. 211.
"2 HOUSE REPORTS, supra note 22.
,, See Alchemie International, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039 (D. N. J. 1981).
'" 95 U.S. 714 (1877),
,,l See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
' See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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also should keep pace to ensure one uniform minimum contacts
standard.
Just as our telecommunications technology has improved, the
burden on a defendant to defend in a distant forum has been eased
by improvements in transportation. The Marina Salina court noted
that the burden was not as important as it once was, and that
the court's decision would not turn on the difficulties of getting
to a distant forum. 30 Given the everday usage of air travel, this
is easily justified.
While judicial application of a restrictive standard poses problems
for plaintiffs today, a more disturbing prospect is the possibility
that the courts will continue to adhere to a conservative interna-
tional standard while domestic standards progress. Unless the judi-
ciary recognizes that FSIA minimum contacts should be treated
exactly as domestic contacts, the minimum contacts test will no
longer be useful in international litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The FSIA has enabled United States citizens to utilize domestic
courts as a forum in which to litigate disputes with foreign sover-
eigns. Congress has transferred the power to decide when foreign
sovereigns are amenable to suit in United States courts from the
executive branch to the judicial branch to give plaintiffs the benefit
of legal expertise rather than changing administration policy. The
legislative history of the Act indicates that the purpose of the Act
is to give United States citizens at the very least a "day in court"
when wronged.
Unfortunately, the courts have been unwilling to utilize the broad
mandate given them. The bench has applied a much more restric-
tive minimum contacts standard to international cases than to
domestic cases. This may be understandable, as the courts never
before have been involved so greatly in international disputes;
however, their caution has not benefitted those for whom the FSIA
was designed.
The minimum contacts standard could be utilized successfully
in FSIA cases. However, the courts must recognize that interna-




'" 649 F.2d at 1271-72.
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